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Abstract 
Based on the literature review, the cost and benefit analysis had been conducted on the high 
quality youth from an economic perspective. Opportunity costs include the monetary benefits, 
non-monetary benefits (the psychological benefits) and the loss-of-time value. Army service 
benefits include immediate service benefits and the expected return. Immediate monetary 
benefits include salaries, benefits, family preference, retirement benefits and so on. For 
non-monetary benefits, the military service not only obtains material benefits, but also receives 
psychological and spiritual benefits, which constitutes an individual's utility function together. 
Theoretically this research could provide useful insights into the military recruit system from a 
new perspective. Firstly, this study can potentially open up a new field from the economic point 
of view for China economics study. Secondly, the framework of this analysis could provide an 
useful research paradigm to similar problems. On the other hand, this research could bring 
about practical contributions by providing references for the policy makers to use any military 
recruit system and other military manpower policy levers to attract, recruit, train, retain, 
maintain and enhance the military human performance. Finally, the limitations of this empirical 
research are discussed and future research are also suggested in different kinds of context. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As attributed to ‘Homer's Iliad’, Men grow tired of sleep, love, singing, and dancing sooner 
than war. Since the humans entered the era of civilization, war has become a way of violence 
interaction style of humankind, and it is the product of a certain stage of the human society. As 
war continuously happened almost around the world, military service system came into being 
and different recruiting systems formed. Recruiting systems refer to institutional arrangements 
which are used to absorb certain quantity, quality and structure of the military manpower to 
meet the needs of the nation’s defense. Basically there are two models: compulsory military 
service (conscription) and all volunteer force (or mercenary). Some countries have combined 
these two models which was known as ‘hybrid military service system’. The human resources 
management is a dynamic process, which includes recruitment, training, detainment, use, 
promotion and development, dismissal and retirement stages. As an organization, army’s 
human resources management process includes recruitment, training, detainment, use, 
promotion, development and retirement stages too. More specifically, military recruit systems 
refer to the systems and methods which absorb the military manpower in the recruitment stage. 
Is there a best model among different recruit models? The short answer might be ‘no’, since the 
best recruit model should be the most suitable one. Some other researchers have argued that the 
models which are able to successfully attract high-quality youth are the good ones. The 
decision makers need to choose the most appropriate model based on the results of benefits and 
costs analysis. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The research on military recruit system has been carried out from many perspectives, such as 
historical perspective, philosophical perspective, political perspective and military human 
resource management view. Historical research relates to the origin and evolution historical 
facts of military recruitment system, therefore people could learn from the success and failure 
in military recruitment system history; philosophical research mainly relates to the military 
recruitment system’s reasonableness or/and unreasonableness from the relationships between 
national and individual rights perspective; political research mainly relates to the 
constitutionality of the military recruitment system from the constitution; from the military 
human resource management’s view, research mainly relates to the process of recruit, military 
training, rotation the salary structure of the military, military manpower development programs 
and labor relations between the military and soldier. 
The research on military recruitment system from an economic perspective was originated by 
Adam Smith. He described the origin and evolution historical facts of military recruitment 
system from the cost-benefit analysis perspective, and he also found that the mode of 
production and technological progress had changed people's cost-benefit structure, thereby 
affecting the choices and evolution of military recruit system.  
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Since the late 20th century, most western countries have abandoned the conscription and started 
to use the AVF(all volunteer force) in the implementation process of army professionalization, 
along with the world's military service system reform and development,. The change in the way 
of military manpower mobilization helps promote the contemporary western economists’ 
attention. Their research were more broadly conducted and deeply digged; they studied 
different kinds of issues in military recruit process. The United States ’research on this 
particular area is a good example. It is just like what Walter Y. 0i said:“John Warner, James 
Miller, and Beth Asch advance the proposition that economics and the economic way of 
thinking played an important role in the decision to end conscription. They are major 
contributors for the growing field of defense economics”. 
2.1 Military manpower demand and supply 
Economists have been using standard career choices theory to study the decisions of individuals 
who want to join the army. Research shows that the decision-making model for enlisting is 
affected by some factors, such as military salary levels, salary levels in the civil sector, the 
unemployment rate, variety of welfare programs provided by the military, personal preferences 
for military life, the threat of war, military advertising, recruitment agency's efforts and other 
factors; therefore the military manpower supply is a function for those variables. To estimate 
the function, different economists use different definitions, models, data and methods, so that 
the conclusions are various.  
Overall, the military manpower supply flexibility is in much higher degree for the salary rate of 
military and civilian sector. The variety of the welfare programs provided by the military, 
military advertising, recruitment agency's efforts, and reaction of the unemployment rate is not 
the same(Charles Brown,1985;Colin Ash，Bernard Udis and Robert F. McNown，1983;Charles 
Dale and Curtis Gilrag，1985;Larry Deboer and B. Wade Brorsen,2001). The empirical research 
on military manpower supply can help the military design the reasonable salary, determine the 
reasonable advertising investment, the forecasting of military manpower supply, and other 
activities. Generally it is believed that the demand for military manpower depends on a 
country's external security environment and national defense strategy;it is often seen as an 
exogenous variable. However, as the military can make choice between differentmilitary 
weapons equipment and manpower; therefore when the price of military manpower rises, 
military would use the capital to replace labor, resulting in reducing the demand for military 
manpower. Cdr. Rolf Clark (1976)and Michael Ridgef (1991) conducted empirical studies in 
the United States and UK respectively, they found that the military made choice between  
military weapons equipment and manpower, but this alternative was found less flexible. This 
also illustrates that the impact of military salary level is a factor that should be taken into 
consideration for military manpower.  
2.2 The cost-effective of military recruit system 
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Walter Y. 0i was one of the early economists who applied economic methods for estimating the 
cost of conscription. Based on Walter Y. 0i’s research, Anthony C. Fisher (1969) used 
probability and statistics to deduce and estimate the U.S. military manpower supply function in 
the presence of conscription. On this basis, he estimated that the spending of military personnel 
would increase in the presence of conscription abolition. During this period, other scholars such 
as Benjamin P. Klutz also used the method to estimate the financial cost of the implementation 
of all voluntary force; his research was further amended for Anthony C. Fisher. In addition to 
the research of military recruit system direct costs, economists also has paid more attention on 
the service impact on the human capital accumulation, and the impact of military skills 
transferability in the civil department on veterans’ income. This can also be seen as an 
important part of cost-benefit analysis on military recruit system. Most studies in this area have 
shown that there is no income gap for those who can transfer military skills (such as electronic, 
electrical and mechanical equipment maintenance) to the civilian sector compared to others 
who did not serve. However, those special military skills (such as fighting skills) had a negative 
impact on the veterans’ income, so these positions should be given higher compensations. 
During the 1960s, after the U.S. was bogged down in the Vietnam War, the anti-war sentiment 
has become much higher，so that people began to criticize directly at the U.S. conscription. 
Many well-known economists were involved in the discussion of the cost of conscription. 
Including Milton Friedman ,A1len W. Wallis， William Mecliling Water Y. 0i and Robert 
Barro, many economists used economic theory and method to analyse deeply on different 
aspects of military recruit system. With their efforts, the United States decided to implement all 
voluntary force in 1973 when are the golden days of the research of military recruit system 
from the economic perspective.  
American scholar Lee and McKenzie in 1992 proposed a theoretical framework, which was 
based on the opportunity cost of personal service. On a basis of different military recruit 
systems, they found that the all voluntary force was superior to draft force not only for cost, but 
also for military manpower quality. Jian guo Gao and Rong Yao(2008)compared to the 
composition of military recruit cost between the all voluntary force and raft force, and they 
found that all voluntary force would be the best way to attract military manpower. 
In 1988, the U.S. General Accounting Office, estimated the military budget cost of the impact 
of all voluntary force transfer based on their own assumptions. They concluded that: from 
conscription to all voluntary force, the military budget cost which might be saved was 7.8 
billion dollars (1988 price).  
2.3 Conscription taxes 
The draft places a conscription tax on those who are forced to serve, the difference between the 
rate of military pay and the opportunity cost of foregone civilian wages. The U.S. defense 
economist Walter Y. 0i thought that conscription was equivalent to putting conscription taxes 
on military manpower, which might lead to the loss of social welfare. For recruit costs, there 
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were budget cost, individual opportunity costs, and salary costs, which were used to overcome 
their aversion to the military occupation. Conscription was equivalent to putting conscription 
taxes on military manpower. The nature, scale, efficiency and fairness of conscription taxes 
became a major concern for economists. W. Lee Hansen and Burton A. Weisbrod have 
analyzed the details of the distribution of conscription taxes effects and configuration efficiency 
in their coauthored “conscription Economics”, and Ryan C. Amacher et al (1982) coauthored 
“conscription Economics”. The United States suffered a tremendous cost in the Iraq war, but 
the government did not set up a special war tax to help solve this problem. The tax measures 
were mainly focused on expanding the scope of social security taxes, improving the fuel, 
cigarettes, alcohol, transportation and other items or services tax, and the removing some 
preferential policies.  
2.4 Service decision-making behavior 
In 1982, American scholar James R. Hosek and Christine E. Peterson finished a study on 
service decision-making behavior of U.S. junior high school students and high school graduates. 
Based on its research framework, people must make their own choices on continuing to go to 
school, work or enlistment, through a large number of social surveys, extensive empirical 
research were carried on ,the goal of research was to find the different factors affecting the 
decision-making behavior of two different groups.  
Decision-making of graduates were based on his tradeoff on costs and benefits, as a rational 
economic man, his pursuit of the given cost of benefits or utility maximization, if the benefits 
of joining the army more than cost, then he may choose to join the army. American scholar 
Nelson. G (1986) provided standard theory of career choice to describe the decision-making 
behavior. He thought the situation when the salary difference between military and civilian 
sector ( )
CMW W  over the net non-monetary income of civilian sector ( )
C M
  , people will be 
recruited. In 1999, Kilbum and Klerman used the data on post-Cold War to extend the 
decision-making model. They found that some variable factors which could effect return rate of 
education such as AFQT test scores, high school graduation age and mother's education level, 
reduced the ratio of these two categories of young people into the army, as a result of that the 
possibility of college was increased. Their research showed that there was a highly alternative 
between the university and military service, for other young people, work and military service 
also has a high alternative. 
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.1 The relation of total costs and high-quality military personnel 
In the mercenary system, the recruitment of high-quality is very useful to improve the combat 
effectiveness of troops, on the surface, recruit high quality youth in accordance with the market 
price law seems to pay the high cost, but it is not always the case. Although the benefits of 
compulsory military are that it can save manpower costs, it is easy to stimulate the military to 
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use manpower wasteful and lower cost. The military is more popular to use low quality youth. 
Thus, the labor price advantage may be offset by the number. According to the economics point, 
the military is a special labor and its production is public goods, namely, defense security 
products. The output level of the national security is established by the investment of a certain 
amount of military manpower and weaponry. We assume that output level of the national 
security is established by the investment of a certain amount of military manpower and 
weaponry. The total cost of the army investment is C, and inputs can be divided into three parts: 
the number of weapons and equipment is W, low-quality youth HL, and high-quality youth HH, 
the average unit cost price of the three were CW, CL, CH, then: 
)(
2
,
HHHCLHLCWWC
HLi
iHiCWWCC 

                               (1) 
From the equation, the total cost of military spending is determined by the level of weapons and 
equipment, different types of quality military personnel and their respective proportion of the 
labor price levels. This equation shows that both labor costs of high-quality military personnel 
and relative size of different quality staff can exert effect on the cost of military manpower. 
Assuming that there is a very small proportion of high-quality military manpower in the initial 
structure of the military manpower, as small as zero, the cost of military manpower mainly 
depends on the labor costs and size of low-quality military personnel. Then, the question is that 
if the army should be reformed to improve the quality of soldiers, use a higher cost to recruit 
high quality soldiers in service, then will it be bound to cause the huge growth of military cost? 
The dynamics time of military high-quality troops recruitment is defined as T1 and T2, then the 
changes of total costs caused by a higher proportion of high-quality military personnel can be 
expressed as: 
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Then 
0)()()1(  HHHCLHLCWCC                                  (4) 
Formula (3) is dependent on the substitution effect of the quality of high-quality military 
personnel and weaponry, the higher the elasticity of substitution, the higher proportion of 
high-quality military personnel will lead to reduce the proportion of low quality military 
Volume 7, No. 2 
176 
personnel, and the cost of weapons and equipment will be reduced too. Thus, the higher 
proportion of high-quality military personnel may not bring the tremendous growth in military 
labor costs.The military will plan carefully the use of human, weapons and the costs of 
equipment research and development, use and maintenance are also reduced effectively by 
high-quality military personnel. In some special nodes, the results will be formula (4), namely 
the total cost of the military changes is zero. Although this point in practice more difficult to 
achieve, but at least the total costs is not the same proportion of the use of high-quality military 
personnel. For example, a study of the U.S. defense economist Daula.T and D. Smith, showed 
that the use of high-quality military personnel would make the equipment cost reductions. 
3.2 Human capital theory 
As defense work does not generate economic benefits directly, its products are national security. 
Therefore, the value is difficult to quantify but is embodied in national defense and military 
benefits. People are regarded as a production means from the modern human capital theory 
perspective, mainly focus on the role of people's quality in the modern economic growth. Many 
scholars thus conclude that human capital is unrelated to defense and military fields, which are 
rarely involved in research. 
In recent years, research on human capital of military has become hot point, In China, Zhang 
Ping, Hu Xiaohua (2002) “Military human capital and the quality construction of armed forces 
in the new century”, Fu Huimin (2002), “research on human capital of national defense science 
and technology”, Hu Liang (2008) “research on military human capital investment”,other 
related papers will be more. But there are just a small number of papers in human military 
capital. A large number of empirical studies on the relationship of human capital and economic 
growth have been carried on, but the problem is how to apply the theory to estimate the 
investment benefits of military human capital? There is no doubt that military's fighting 
capacity depend on military human capital level, but it is quite difficult to assess accurately the 
relationship between the two, since the military field has a completely different indicators from 
economic. Therefore, the ration of military's fighting capacity may be the only standard to 
measure military human capital. However, the military's fighting capacity is affected by many 
factors, it is a complex process, some indicators are not clear and accurate like economic. 
Especially in the peace times, he military's fighting capacity is different in different industries 
and military departments. Taking the military industry as example, the performance of military 
capacity in the field of military research and the performance of military research capacity in 
the field of armed forces , the level of training and operational levels. Therefore, the research 
on military human capital must combine the general human capital theory and the reality of 
armed forces to analyze in detail.  
Social benefits of investment in human capital refers to the investment in education, in addition 
to the benefit of individuals or families, which includes the benefits of other society members 
which the individuals can not fully occupied. For example, a number of significant inventions 
for education improved, the proceeds will go far beyond the scope of the inventor himself. 
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Engels pointed out: “The educated community members bring more benefits to society than 
ignorant uneducated people. ... On the other hand, only educated workers have the kind of calm 
and careful which need by the peaceful society transformation”  
At present, the Measure of social return rate on human capital includes the incremental 
contribution method of Schultz, the contribution rate of Denison and simplified coefficients 
method. Schultz calculated that the return rate of primary education is 35%, secondary 
education is 10%, higher education is 11%, the average return rate is 17.3%. In order to 
improve the quality of education, the United States has invested $ 291.2 billion from 1929 to 
1957, so the gains were: 2912 x 17.3% = 504 million. American economist Denison, published 
book in 1962 “American Economic Growth and the choice we face”, to use their own methods, 
according to U.S. data above, average annual growth rate during this period is 2.93%,  
Marx has an excellent argumentation to it in“Das Kapital”, It has offered valuable material and 
method for the fact that we ponder over this question. When the financial crisis took off last 
autumn, Karl Marx's “Das Kapital”, originally published in 1867, whooshed up bestseller lists, 
He said: “a small amount of ordinary complex labor equal to the large amounts of simple labor”. 
Complex labor needs higher education; it can create higher value at the same time. Based on 
this principle, the main method is to use simplified labor coefficient to simplify the complex 
labor, on this basis, we can calculate the military human capital. 
Obviously, the first step of this approach is to determine the simplified labor coefficient, which 
is the key to the method and it is very difficult. Here, the length of education determines the 
ratio between the complex labor and simple labor. As generally believed, under normal 
circumstances, the length of education years is positive correlation to complexity of the work. 
In theory, the military with longer education years has the ability to master complex military 
technology, the combat effectiveness is higher, on the contrary, the military with shorter 
education years, the combat effectiveness is relatively low. Zhang Ping, Hu Xiaohua (2002) 
estimated the contribution rate for combat effectiveness is 19.71%. 
4. COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
4.1 The cost of individual 
The socio-economic system consists of two departments, namely, the military and local civilian 
sector. Individuals standing in front of the two demand side: one side is the military, the other is 
the local civil sector, where to go, they will make a choice between the two (third option, that is 
not working, but this choice does not constitutes the opportunity cost of military career, it will 
not be considered).If the individual through the trade-offs and made the choice of army service, 
then they also give up work opportunity at the local civilian sector, the local civilian sector 
earnings constitute the opportunity cost of their military service. The so-called opportunity cost 
of army service, is the result of individual choice to work in the military and give up work in 
the local civilian sector, so, obviously, they last currency and non-monetary benefits in the local 
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civilian sector. As a rational economic man, the opportunity cost of his/her choice is important 
key parameters. If the opportunity cost of personal service over the proceeds of its service, they 
will choose work in the civilian sector. Opportunity cost includes the following aspects: the 
monetary benefits: the income in the local civilian sector, non-monetary benefits: the 
psychological benefits, the loss of time value. 
4.1.1 The cost of monetary benefits 
Assumption in T fiscal year, income level of high-quality individuals work at the local civilian 
sector is CW , the recruitment opportunity cost of N high-quality individuals in is: 
CWNTOC                                                                 (5)                                            
Where, TOC is N high quality individuals’ total opportunity cost of income, CW is N high 
quality individuals’ average opportunity cost of income.  
This formula is only theoretical so that reality is difficult to calculate. We can use the theory of 
human capital to estimate the level of income depends on the level of human capital stock, 
under normal circumstances, the more years of education, the higher the human capital 
ownership, the higher the income levels. Education and human capital investment rate of return 
is an effective way to measure individuals’ income levels work at local civilian sector. We can 
use the Mencerian Rate of Return to conduct investigations. The expression of Mencerian Rate 
of Return is: 
㏑ 
2)()( EXdEXcSbaCW                                           (6)                       
Where, CW is personal income of laborers, measured by annual personal income lever. S  is 
education years of laborers, EX is service length of laborers, Squared service length reflect a 
nonlinear relationship between income and service length, because to a certain extent the 
impact of person's work experience on their income will tend to weaken, stagnation and even 
retrogression.  is a random error term, represents the other factors in addition to education and 
work experience, coefficient b  represents individual education rate of return, that is, the 
individual received income from school formal education. 
Thus, if the data is sufficient, we can use egression analysis of measurement based on model 
(5), each estimated variable obtained from data fitting regression coefficient, so you can get 
personal education rate of return in a range, the coefficient b , Furthermore, get CW from b . 
If the individual after graduation at the university immediately to enter the military, his 
opportunity cost of the initial service can be expressed as: 
)exp( SbaCW                                                      (7) 
If the individual after N years to enter the military, his opportunity cost of the initial service can 
be expressed as: 
                                      (8) 
)2exp( NdNcSbaCW 
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4.1.2 The cost of Non-monetary benefits 
In the labor supply model, individuals ’decision is between work and leisure. If he chooses to 
work, then leisure constitute the opportunity cost of their work, and leisure is more a 
psychological income or utility, not properties with direct price. Similarly, individuals who 
choose to join the army service, he is bound to give up work at the local civilian sector, then he 
will lose some benefits which can not measure directly with currency or price, that we call 
“psychological benefits”. That constitutes the opportunity cost of personal join the army. If a 
person like safety, comfortable and easy when he work at the local civilian sector, now pay him 
a certain amount of money, so he would rather give up the work to join the army, the utility of 
money is equivalent to the psychological benefits. But maybe his real income is less than what 
he expected, the loss of psychological benefits will be occur, we can use behavioral economics 
theory to explain this phenomenon. 
Dainiel Kahneman and Amos Tvrsky(1979) published their famous paper “A Prospect 
Theory :An Analysis of Decision under Risk”, which was one of the founding papers of 
behavioral economics. Prospect theory is a theory that describes decisions between alternatives 
that involve risk, where the probabilities of outcomes are known. The model is descriptive: it 
tries to model real-life choices, rather than optimal decisions. It describes how people choose 
between probabilistic alternatives and evaluate potential losses and gains. In the original 
formulation the term prospect referred to a lottery. The theory describes the decision processes 
in two stages, editing and evaluation. In the first, outcomes of the decision are ordered 
following some heuristic. In particular, people decide which outcomes they see as basically 
identical, set a reference point and then consider lesser outcomes as losses and greater ones as 
gains. In the following evaluation phase, people behave as if they would compute a value 
(utility), based on the potential outcomes and their respective probabilities, and then choose the 
alternative having a higher utility. 
The theory describes the decision processes in two stages: editing and evaluation. In the first 
instance, outcomes of the decision are ordered following some heuristic. In particular, people 
decide which outcomes they see as basically identical, set a reference point and then consider 
lesser outcomes as losses and greater ones as gains. In the following evaluation phase, people 
behave as if they would compute a value (utility), based on the potential outcomes and their 
respective probabilities, and then choose the alternative having a higher utility. 
The value function (sketched in the Figure 1) that passes through the reference point is s-shaped 
and asymmetrical. Losses hurt more than gains feel good (loss aversion). This differs greatly 
from expected utility theory, in which a rational agent is indifferent to the reference point. In 
expected utility theory, the individual only cares about absolute wealth, not relative wealth in 
any given situation. The function is a probability weighting function and expresses that people 
tend to overreact to small probability events, but under react to medium and large probabilities. 
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Fig.1 The value function 
Souce:Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky (1979) "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision under Risk", Econometrica, XLVII (1979), 263-291.  
If psychological factor is decision-making factors of high-quality recruits, then, different utility 
functions are: 
Assumed prospect utility function of fully rationality is: 
)()()1()( xpVxVpxG                                                 (9)                                         
Then prospect utility function of bounded rationality is: 
)()()1()( xpVxVpxF                                            (10)                              
Function above, )(xV  is the value function of enlistment, p is the probability of successful 
employment after retirement based on fully rationality, p  is the probability of successful 
employment after retirement based on bounded rationality, decision-weighting function p  is 
monotone increasing function, discontinuous from 0 to 1. 
)()( xGxFC                                                      (11) 
Function above, C is difference of prospect utility between fully and bounded rationality, 
namely opportunity cost of psychological. 
4.1.3 The loss of human capital incremental value 
From the perspective of generation and use, military human capital can be divided into the cost 
of individual value C and the value added value B . These are the stock and incremental value of 
human capital, the cost of individual value C means the labor costs of pre-paying intellectual 
ability, the necessary means of subsistence reproduction value, it is full cost of military human 
losses outcome 
value 
reference point 
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capital individual which in order to obtain their own knowledge and skills, including 
professional training fee and the opportunity costs, the necessary means of subsistence 
reproduction value costs. The incremental value of individual B means the value generated in 
the process of work experience. The basic model of military human capital individual value is:  
V C B                                                                  (12)                  
As the stock value of military human capital is the same before they join the army or enter local 
civil sector, the opportunity cost are discussed, then there is some incremental loss of human 
capital, people's time value is always expressed the stock of human capital continuous 
improvement over time, and thus brought about the ability to work and income capabilities.  
If you choose to join the army, then the service will excluded the accumulation of experience 
and capabilities at local civil sector during the time, affecting the civilian human capital 
accumulation, resulting in the time value loss of people's, once exit active duty to the local 
civilian sector, their earning capacity will be affected and weakened. 
Especially those skills of military positions can not be converted to civilian positions so that 
earning capacity will be greatly diminished after they retired. From the special nature of human 
capital perspective, the time value of high quality youth is also affected by the special nature of 
military human capital. In the two extreme cases, if the special nature of military human capital 
is very high, its conversion to civilian human capital would be zero, and the time value would 
be lost completely. If the special nature of military human capital is very low, that is, its 
military-specific nature is zero, the loss of time value would be zero. The military experience 
can give him benefits at the local job. However, reality is always between the two situations, in 
which service is bound to bring the time value loss of high quality youth more or less, further 
affecting their future earnings. Based on anticipated income method, we construct the following 
formula: 
1 (1 )
n
t
F t
t
R
B
i


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

                                                   (13)                                                 
Where,
FB
,the anticipated income of military human capital in the military sector,
tR , the 
anticipated income in the military during time t , t , income years, i , discount rate,  ,profit 
contribution rate of military human capital in the military sector. 
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                                                 (14)       
Where, /
FB  ,the anticipated income of military human capital in the civilian sector,
/
tR , the 
anticipated income in the civilian sector during time t , t , income years, i ,discount rate, /  
profit contribution rate of military human capital in the civilian sector. 
If we calculated the difference of the anticipated income in the civilian and military sector 
respectively, we can get the possible incremental loss. 
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/
F FC B B                                                     (15) 
C is the loss of human capital incremental value. 
The evaluation process is as follows: (1)determine the income years, without considering the 
leaving probability to calculate the remaining working life, retired age is 
60-year-old,(2)determine the business net profit, based on historical data, according to second 
exponential smoothing method to predict the future corporate profit,(3) determine the discount 
rate according to expert advice,(4)calculated profit contribution rate of military human capital 
in different departments,(5) according to the formula above to calculate the value. 
4.2 The benefits of individual 
Army service benefits can be summarized from different points of view. From the time 
dimension perspective, immediate service benefits and expected return would be gained from 
revenue nature, monetary benefits and non-monetary benefits. Immediate service benefits refer 
to the gains during the service until people retired or quit active. According to the nature of 
income, immediate service benefits can be divided into the immediate monetary benefits and 
non-monetary benefits. Immediate monetary benefits include, salaries, benefits, family 
preference, retirement benefits and so on. Non-monetary benefits, military service not only to 
obtain material benefits, but also receive psychological and spiritual benefits, the two together 
constitute the individual's utility function. Expected return come from human capital 
accumulation in military service, including deep-level training on skills and knowledge in 
military service, a lot of healthy human capital, strictly formal military training, medical and 
health care, strong ideals and beliefs, discipline and so on, these factors are very good for 
working in the civil sector, such military human capital can be effectively translated into 
civilian human capital and to obtain long-term gains. 
Just like Khammonds(2001)said “West Point, another ‘Harvard Business School’, the military 
school has trained more than 60% of the world's top 500's CEO. In China, many entrepreneurs 
have a army service background, such as Liu Chuanzh-chairman of the board in Lenovo Group, 
Wang Shi- CEO of Vanke, Ren Zhengfei- CEO of Huawei and so on. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The theoretical contributions of this paper include, First, there is no doubt that the analysis and 
research provide some useful insights into the military recruit system from a new perspective, 
which will enhance and amend our knowledge and understanding of military recruit system. 
Second, from economic point of view, the study opened up a new field for China economics 
study, western economists have done a lot of work, but the Chinese study of this issue is still 
rare. This preliminary research can play a pioneering role in causing people to this and other 
related issues. Finally, the analysis framework may provide a useful research paradigm to 
similar problems. 
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The practical contributions of this paper include providing a reference for policy makers, the 
use of military recruit system and other military manpower policy levers to attract, recruit, train, 
retain, maintain and enhance the military human performance. 
The limitations of this paper are that this empirical research is not sufficient and it needs to be 
validated in different contexts. This empirical research should be conducted by fuzzy 
comprehensive evaluation, in this case, data collection is very important. Although force 
constitute rationality, alternative cost analysis of force types could provide thedirection for 
future research. 
Theoretically this research could provide useful insights into the military recruit system from a 
new perspective. Firstly, this study can potentially open up a new field from the economic point 
of view for China economics study. Sencondly, the framework of this analysis could provide a 
useful research paradigm to similar problems. On the other hand, this research could bring 
about practical contributions by providing references for the policy makers touse any military 
recruit system and other military manpower policy levers to attract, recruit, train, retain, 
maintain and enhance the military human performance. Finally, the limitations of this empirical 
research are discussed and future research are also suggested in different kinds of context. 
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